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Mobile payment systems. as their name suggests, are systems that are used to carry out financial
transactions over a mobile telecommunications network. There are two main models of mobile
payment systems I:
I. The Additive model - The mobile phone is simply used as a conduit for access to an
existing bank account e.g. mobile banking services, which allow bank customers to
access their bank accounts from their mobile phones.
II. The Transformative model - The financial service is based entirely upon the mobile
phone/ (from the user 's perspective). Examples of these include Mpesa and Airtel
money, mobile payment services offered by the two leading mobile
telecommunications companies - Safaricorn and Airte] Kenya.
This paper shall focus on the latter model, as the technical and legal aspects of the two systems are
quite dissimilar. As such , any reference to mobile payment systems hereafter, except where an
express exception has been made, shall be intended to mean Transformative models of mobile
payment systems.
Mobile payment systems are intended to operate on the most basic phones and as such, any phone
with the ability to access the Sim Toolkit (STK) menu should be able to access mobile payment
services. The customer does not need to have a bank account, but registers with Safaricom for an
M-PESA account. ' To get access to mobile payment services, the prospective user is meant to
register with the service provider (the telecommunications service provider, in this case). The
generally accepted practice is to present the network's agent with your Identification documents
(10 card or passport) and after confirmation ofthe details, you shall be sent a confirmation message
with your default PIN, which you shall be required to change.
Registration of an account entitles one to a mobile wallet, from which all further transactions shall
be carried out. To deposit money into the mobile wallet, the user gives an agent of the service
I Porteous D. 'ENABLING ENVIRONMENT FOR CELL PHONE BANKING IN AFRICA' . 3
2 Ghosh I, 'The Agent in a Transformational M-Banking Ecosystem - Interface or Intermediary T [20 I3] Proceedings
of the Sixth International Conference on Information and Communication Technologies and Development Full Papers
- ICTD "13 - volume 1 33
3 Hughes N and Lonie S, 'M-PESA: Mobile Money for the "Unbanked' Turning Cell phones into 24-Hour Tellers in




provider cash. The agent then credits the user's account with mobile money. With the money in
the mobile wallet. the user can then choose to transfer money to another user (registered or not) by
selecting that action and entering the recipient's phone number and confirming the transaction .
Alternatively, one may choose to withdraw money from his/her mobile wallet. To do this , one
visits an agent's shop and chooses the option to withdraw money, enters the agent's unique agent
number and confirms the transaction. On presentation of identification documents, the agent then
hands over the cash amount (and receives the mobile money from the user's mobile wallet). These
three actions (deposit, transfer and withdrawal) are the most basic transactions that are provided
by all mobile payment systems.
A number of additional services are offered by service providers in order to make their products
more convenient to use or more attracti ve to their customers. For example, to extend the deposit
function, one may deposit money from their bank account to their mobile money account,
eliminating the need to visit an agent. To extend the withdrawal functions , most service providers
allow their customers to withdraw money from supported ATMs. This, again, eliminates the need
for an agent. In addition to these two mobile payment service providers allow the customers to use
their phones to pay for goods or util ity bills in lieu of cash payments.
The basic operation of the mobile payment systems involves the following entities:
I. The Mobile Network Operator (MNO) - This is the telecommunications service
provider who provides the mobile phone infrastructure over which the mobile payment
system operates. They are licensed and regulated by the Communications Authority of
Kenya (CA)
11. The Commercial Bank(s) - The MNO on its own does not have the license to have
custody of the cash deposited by the users. The law requires the mobile payment system
to deposit the cash deposits in a commercial bank account", The bank account, as per
the CBK approved business model, is held by a trust operated by the MNO with all the
mobile payment system's users as beneficiaries".
111. The Agent - The agent is a person contracted to facilitate certain transactions for the
customers . These include carrying out the registration ofnew customers and conversion
of mobile money into cash and vice versa. They also carry out elementary training on
how to use mobile money for the benefit of the new users .
4 National Payment Systems Regulations 2014 Section 25(3)(f)




The growth of the mobile payment systems depends, not only on advancements in mobile
technology, but also on customer confidence in the services being offered. To the lay customer,
mobile money transfer presents a highly convenient method oftransferring money from one person
to the other- Faster and cheaper than most of the alternatives. In addition to the speed and cost of
transactions, one walks around with money in their mobile wallets and , even when this has been
exhausted, there are agents within a reasonable distance of most places. This makes it seem to be
the most convenient alternative of the money transfer systems for small amounts of money. The






1 Research Problem and Methodology
1.1 Research Question
This study shall focus on assessing the need for regulation of mobile money and the extent to
which it can be regulated without hampering future development or making the service
economically inviable.
This shall be achieved by considering a basic question question:
How can mobile money be regulated?
The question is best answered by considering the following questions:
I . Is the regulatory framework around mobile money adequate?
2. What parts of the mobile money ecosystem require additional regulation?
3. Do the benefits of increased regulation outweigh the costs?
4. Has similar regulation been successful in other jurisdictions?
By answering the above questions, we should be able to gauge if and how mobile money is to be
regulated. Where regulation is deemed necessary, we are able to gauge from the successes and
failures of other jurisdictions and thus produce a regulatory structure that will work in our
circumstances.
1.2 Research Methodology
"1 never guess. It is a shocking habit - destructive to the logical faculty. "
Sherlock Holmes (Sir Arthur Conan Doyle) - The Sign of Four (\ 890) 6
Given the questions above, a proper methodology should be employed to get to the answers. Here
I shall explain what methods I choose and why
6 Hodgson P. ' What user researchers can learn from Sherlock Holmes' (12 April 2015)







1.2.1 The case for Qualitative Analysis
In attempting to answer the questions posed, I decided to make use of qualitative analysis. Marshall
and Rossman aptly likened the process of qualitative analysis to the detective work of Sherlock
Holmes or an investigative reporter". On stumbling upon a curious phenomenon, the researcher
seeks to describe or explain said phenomenon.
I attempt to find out why mobile money is under-regulated in Kenya and whether this poses any
risk. In attempting to answer this, I shall look to evidence from other jurisdictions on the same
matter and on closely related issues. Quantitative analysis is highly unlikely to yield any purposeful
results other than providing a context to the information being gathered.
1.2.2 The case for a Case Study
A case stud y focuses on a small portion of the cases in order to provide insight into a causal
relationship across a larger populations. Given the small sample size (four Mobile Network
Operators), and the nature of the research questions, I chose to select the most influential mobile
money system as a case study with the expectation that it would reflect what goes on in the mobile
money sector. In a bid to show the lack of regulation, however, I shall at times consider more than
one mobile money operator indicate the lack of a standard that cuts across the sector.
The Case study chosen for the research is M-Pesa, the ubiquitous financial service that Kenyans
cannot seem to live without these days. Furthermore, it has been at the forefront of innovation in
all matters concerning mobile money .. .it leads the way.
1.2.3 Research Design
I have analyzed the mobile money system 111 Kenya and done a comparative analysis of the
circumstances in Kenya and in other countries with mobile money services in order to get a better
understanding of whether the foreign regulations could be employed in Kenya.
A case study requires thorough analysis of secondary data in order to contextualize the primary
data ", The secondary data available is mostly commentary on the legal regime that exists at the
7 Marshall C and Rossman G B, Designing qualitative research. 3rd ed. Sage Publi cations 199922
S GERRING L Case study research: Principles and practices/ John Gerring. Cambridge University Press 2007 86







moment. To a lesser degree. financial reports and statistics were also analyzed, albeit at a
superficial level. All this was in order to give proper context to the statutory regulations that were
being considered during the research.
1.3 Challenges and Limitations to the Study
There were numerous challenges to the study. The biggest of these was the limited amount of
literature on the field of mobile money, as it is quite a new field. Most of the commentary was
from an economic point of view, with little consideration for the legal aspect of the service.
In addition, it was quite difficult to access some documents as the y are paid subscriptions and I
could onl y gain access to a few of them.
Time was also a major constraint as I conducted the study as the time allowed for conduction of
the study was taken up by regular schoolwork.
Finally yet importantl y, the scope of the study was enormous and, given the time available, it




2· The Case for Increased Regulation
In order to obtain "Pareto Efficient" outcomes, where the players in a market all get the best
possible outcome, there must exist certain perfect circumstances. The individuals must be properly
informed and the market must be competitive , having certain amenities vital to the flourishing of
business such as insurance and -credit facilities. Needless to say , the occurrences of the requisite
circumstances in the perfect manner is a rarity and as such, government regulation must step in to
direct the market!" .
The National Payment Systems Act 2011 (NPS Act) and the National Payment Systems
Regulations 2014 (NPS Regulations) constitute the bulk of the regulation surrounding mobile
payment systems. Regulation of mobile payment systems is primarily justified, just as regulation
of any other service, by the immense public interest. Th is presents itself in a number of ways :
Consumer Protection, Competition Laws and even Security issues. The adequacy of the current
regulation in addressing the major regulatory concerns is questionable (as shall be argued in this
paper).
It is evident that Kenyans are getting increasingly more dependent on mobile payment services for
carrying out their daily transactions. While it has been argued (quite reasonably) that the situation
is far from posing a systemic risk to the economy! 1, a collapse of mobile payment systems is likely
to make financial transactions that much more difficult (go ing to a bank branch vs keying in digits
on your phone) . This is a reasonable conclusion given the amount of money that passes through
mobile payment systems annually. Details provided by Central Bank show that at least 2.5 million
money transfer transactions are carried out dail y with banks accounting for only 3.2 per cent of
the total. In 2014, mobile payments facilitated 911 .34 million transactions while banks conducted
only 29.68 million.l''
10 Stiglitz J, 'Regulation and failure ' New Perspectives on Regulation [2009] 162 <http://www.tobinproj ect.org/books-
papers/new-perspectives-regulation>
II Di Castri S. 'Mobile Mone y: Enabling regulatory solutions' [2013] I
12 'Banks take on M-Pesa in fight for mone y transfer billions ' <http://www.nation.co.ke/business/Banks-take-on-M-




In addition to preventing collapse of the system, it is reasonable to enforce regulation that would
make the mobile payment service market open to new entrants. For this to happen, there must be
certainty as to the minimum requirements required for new entrants and structures in place to
eliminate unfair barriers to entry. A lot has been done to introduce legal certainty with regard to
registration of new mobile payment services. The NPS Regulations codified the requirements for
registering payment systems (including mobile payment systems). This should make it easier to
register a new service and avoid situations such as that which arose during the earlier days of
mobile money transfer where the Central Bank was accused of denying or delaying the approval
of an MNO 's application for a license to offer mobile payrnents.P
In addition to certainty in the application process, regulations on competition should be able to
restrict the abuse of market dominance by a player in the mobile payments arena. The NPS
Regulations partly addressed this issue by prohibiting exclusivity clauses in the contracts between
the agents and the MNOSl 4 . Before, agents were unable to represent more than one MNO and
given the heavy dependence of the mobile payment systems on a wide agent network, it would be
extremely difficult for a new entrant to the market to get proper footing':'.
Aside from the measures to stem financial risks and deal with competition matters, the law should
also address operational risks such as privacy concerns and security issues. There are privacy
concerns around the basic operation ofmobile money systems. When transacting through an agent,
one must present the agent with identification documents and on top of that, sign for the amount
received. While this may be important for record keeping purposes, there is a significant risk that
arises with no justified benefit.
This paper shall focus on the following areas of regulation :
1. Regulation of systemic risk
II. Regulation on operational risk
Ill. Regulation on competition and anti-trust
13 'Central Bank ofKenya : Mobile Phone Financial Services in Kenya IA Political Kenya in 2014: Latest Politics and
Kenya Economy News ' (9 November 2015) <http://kenyapolitical.blogspot.co.ke/2009/0 I/central-bank-of-kenya-
mobile-phone.html> accessed 14 January 2016
I ~ Section 15(2) National Payment System Regulatoins 2014





2.1 Regulation of Systemic Risk
Systemic risk refers to the risk or probability of breakdowns in an entire system, as opposed to
breakdowns in individual paI1S or components, and is evidenced by comovements (correlation)
among most or all the parts. 16. Due to the dependence of other entities on an entity within the
financial system, a collapse of that entity is likely to cause a cascading failure within the system
just as a house of cards falls apart once the first is pulled out.
As of 20 14, 2.5 million money transfer transactions are carried out daily with banks accounting
for only 3.2 per cent of the total. Mobile payments facilitated 911.34 million transactions while
banks conducted only 29.68 million .!" The most accurate measure of the prevalence of the mobile
money system would probably be the throughput value, as opposed to throughput volume. In
comparison to banks, mobile mone y transfers a lot less mone y in terms of value (6.59%) 18 . Banks
are known to pose a systemic risk , due to their interconnectedness to the national economy and the
sheer amount of money they transact (hence the prudential regulations imposed on them)
With the increase in popularity of mobile money in the country and the diversification of the
services offered by the service providers, the footprint of the service on the economy is growing! ".
Whether said footprint is significant enough to pose a risk is another matter altogether, especially
considering the amounts of money involved in mobile payments.
On the current state of affairs , there is consensus that the service does not pose a systemic risk 20 .
The reason for this is that while there are a lot of movements of money within mobile money
systems, the total amount of deposits held in said systems is not significant enough to be a threat
to the stability of the system as a whole if the mobile payment systems fail to meet their
16 Kaufman G G and Scott K E, 'What Is Systemic Risk , and Do Bank Regul ators Retard or Contribute to It?' 7(3)
The Independent Review, A Journal of Political Economy (2003 ) 371 375
<http://www.independent.org/pd f/tir /tir_07_3_scott .pdf\nhttp ://www.independent.org/pllbl ications/tir/article.asp?a=
88>
17 'Banks take on M-Pesa in fight for money transfer billions' <http://www.nation.co.ke/business/Banks-take-on-M-
Pesa-in-fight-for-money-transfer-billions/-1996/2836358/-16fe3n8/-/index.html> accessed 14 January 20 16.
1& Muthiora B, 'New infog raphic : Mobile money and the digitisation of Kenya 's retail payments systems ' [2014]
<http://dotafrica.mobi/infographic-mobile-money-digitisation-kenyas-retail-payments-systems/> accessed 26
January 2016
19 Hinz M, 'M-PESA: The Best of Both Worlds ' <https:llwww.bbvaresearch.com/en/publicaciones/m-pesa-the-best-
of-both-worlds/> accessed 15 Janu ary 2016




ob ligations'". If the value of the deposits is to increase, however, the associated risk will increase
'with it.
Whatever the amount of risk, however, it would be wise to implement prudential monitoring on
mobile mone y in order to ensure stability of the small portion of the economy (in monetary value)
as it seems to serve a significant portion of the population, regardless of its monetary value.
2.2 Regulation of Operational Risk
2.2.1 Credi t Risk
Clients depositing their money into financial inst itutions are , as far as the law is concerned,
unsec ured creditors of the financial 22 • As such, the risk of non -repayment of the money deposited
is an issue when the banks fall into insolvency. In Ken ya, this risk is mitigated by deposit
insurance, which is mandatory for eve ry institution registered by the Central Bank23.
It has been argued that the credit risk on mobile money funds , considering the struct ure of mobile
money systems, is non-existenr'f'" . This is because the money transferred to the mobi le wallets is
fully backed by a cash amount that had been pre deposited by the agent in exchange for the mobile
mone y. The money is then held under a trust, whose beneficiaries are the depositors themselves.
As such , the providers are not allowed to interfere with or benefit from the funds26 . This would
eliminate the credit risk, as the amount that has been deposited by th e users is the same amount,
ideally, that shou ld be withdrawn.
~I Di Castri S. 'Mobile Money: Enabling regulatory solutions '
~~ Unsecured Creditors of Failed Banks: It's Not a Wonderful Life ' (1991) http ://www.jstor.or!!/sta ble!l34 1671
Accessed on 25th November 2015
~3 Section 24 Kenya Deposit Insurance Act (No . 10 of20 12)
~4 Kaseken de L. 'Mobi le Money Services - Ta lking Points ' Igarss 2014 [20 14] I <http://nyucted.org/wp-
content /uploads/20 12/11Ilouis-kasekende-mobile-money-uganda2.pdf.>
~5 Afi, ' Enabling mobile money transfer The Central Bank of Kenya's treatment of M-Pesa ' Alliance for Financial
Inclusion [20 I0] 16 <http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-
conten tluploads/20 13/09/enablingmobilemoneytransfer92.pdf.>
~6 'Ringfencing and Safeguard of Customer Money I Mobi le for Development'
<http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/programmes/mobile-money/safeguard-of-customer-money>





Section 24 of the Kenya Deposit Insurance Act (KDI Act) states that an y institution licensed by
the Central Bank shall be a member of the fund. Mobile money providers, however, fall short of
the definition of an " institut ion" under the Central Bank Act. As such, the money deposited by the
users of the various services are not insured individually", The money amount that is held in trust
by the Mpesa providers, however, is covered by Deposit insurance due to the fact that the
Commercial Bank(s) that the money is deposited into are members ofthe Kenya Deposit Insurance
Fund under Section 24 above.
The KDI Act defines deposits as the unpaid balance of the aggregate of deposits received or held
by a member institution from or on behalf of a person in the usual course of the business of deposit
taking and shall include.":
(a) A bank draft, certified cheque or other similar instrument or payment instruction, drawn
or made against a deposit account for which the member institution shall be primarily
liable ;
(b) A cheque entered into a payment system notwithstanding any delay or failure by the
member institution in crediting the payee's account; or
(c) Any other liability or financial instrument as may be specified by the Corporation but
excludes:
(i) A deposit that is not payable in Kenya;
(ii) Bearer negotiable instruments of deposit;
(iii) An y sum of money payable under a repurchase agreements;
(iv) Interbank transactions; and
(v) Any other liability or financial instrument as may be specified by the Corporation;
The Act still fails to define deposits generally (using the word itself in its definition) but defines
the deposits that ma y be insured under the Fund. As such, whether a deposit shall be protected
depends solely on whether the insured party is a member of the Fund. Given the criteria for
27 Jack Wand Suri T. 'Mobile mone y: the economics ofM-PESA' (20 II) 10
28 Section 2 Kenya Deposit Insurance Act (No . 10 of2012)
Page I I I
Strathmore University
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compulsory membership, it cannot be guaranteed that every mobile money provider shall have
their funds insured'".
There are two distinct, and seemingly correct, arguments concerning the protection of user funds
by the Deposit Insurance Fund . In both cases, the definition of the Mpesa users ' funds is central to
the argument,
On one hand, the question of whether mobile money schemes qualify for deposit insurance is met
with a straight answer: no. The argument goes that since such funds are not in the strict legal sense
'deposits ' as defined under the Banking Act, and the beneficial owners of the funds do not have
customer/banker relationships with the institutions in which the trust fund has been placed in
respect of their entitlement under the mobile money scheme, it follows therefore that each mobile
money customer's entitlement cannot be considered a protected deposit."
On the other hand , it has been argued that the Kenya Deposit Insurance Act , having created a
structure where each of the beneficiaries in a Trustee or Joint account has their deposits insured
separately, the deposits by the customers are , in fact , protected.31. This, howe ver , assumes that the
Mpesa users ' funds can be defined as deposits .
2.2.2 Privacy Concerns
During the normal course of use of mobile money, a user is required to divulge private information
to a cash merchant who he mayor may not know well. The extent to which the web of agents has
spread is convenient to the users in that they can get their services from many more agents and
profitable to the service providers because more customers will be willing to register if they are
able to get more convenient services. It, however, presents a nightmare with regard to supervision
of the individual agents and their conduct, especially in the case of misconduct that is as
29 Section 24 Keny a Deposit Insurance Act (No. 10 of2012)
30 ' Reinventing the Wheel : "Pass Through" Deposit Insurance coverage for Mobile Money in Kenya I Mobile for
Development ' <http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/reinventing-the-wheel-pass-through-deposit-
insurance-coverage-for-mobile-money-in-kenya> accessed 25 December 20 15




unnoticeable as divulging private information (names, ID numbers and corresponding signatures)
to the wrong people.
When transacting through an agent, a customer IS required to present the agent with their
identification documents (National ID or passport) and sign to confirm the transaction.P The fact
that there are multiple ways to access one 's money without having to sign, let alone present anyone
with identification documents means that it is either unnecessary or there is an unclosed loop in
the security system. One of the ways to bypass the revelation of personal details is simply to
withdraw the amount at an ATM machine or to pay for goods and services using your phone at
supported outlets. The two services are both offered by the two largest mobile payment service
providers at the moment.
The matter ofprivacy presents itselfmore as an academic problem than an actual problem affecting
the people at the moment. This, however, has been argued to be mostly due to the laissez faire
attitude that most people have to invasion of privacy under such circumstances.
2.2.3 Regulation of Security Risk
In response to the terrorist attacks over the past two' decades and the increase in movements of
cash for illegal purposes e.g . Drug trade and human trafficking, there has been pressure on financial
institutions to help in curbing such occurrences at an early stage. This is a reasonable expectation
given the fact that most of these activities have been proven to require immense financing
beforehand.
Over time , Know Your Customer (KYC) standards have been developed at an international level
to ensure that the bank knows whom it's transacting with . This serves many purposes but the two
purposes below':':
3: Deutsche Welle (www.dw.com) . ·Privacy concerns in Kenya as users turn to M-Pesa to catch cheating partners I
Sci-Tech I DW.COM I 12.07.20 I3' <http://www.dw.com/en/privacy-concerns- in-kenya-as-lisers-turn-to-m-pesa-to-
catch-cheating-partners/a- 16947446> accessed 15 January 20 I6
33 'Know your customer: Global anti-money laundering measures: PwC
<http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/industries/financial-services/publicat ions/anti-mOneY-laUndering-knOW-YOlIr-customer-




I . Identifying the party/parties that are transacting with a given account and by extension
blacklisting relevant people e.g. those on terrorist watch lists
2. Tracking transactions, where need arises, attached to a specific account
2.3 Regulations on Competition
The Competition Authority of Kenya has identified telecommunications as one of several markets
being scrutinized by the Competition Authority for possible abuses of dominance.34 Among others,
bundling of services has been considered to be an abuse of dominance in cases where the other
services are substandard or overpriced but due to one of the services in the bundle (mobile
payments in this case), the customer does not have too choice ifhe/she intends to use the dominant
mobile payments system". While the bundling of the services may seem to be a major issue with
regards to competition, the most prevalent issues have to be interoperability and exclusivity of
agents .
The argument by Safaricom, the country's most dominant mobile payment service provider, has
been that it cannot be punished simply for being a dominant player in the marker". This may be
(and they argue it to be) a natural result ofgood business practice.". While the truth ofthe statement
is not a target of this research, the actions of Safaricom in response to competitive forces must be
noted.
2.3.1 lnteroperability
Perhaps the most important regulatory Issue relating to cornpetmon 111 mobile money is the
interoperability of mobile money'" -the ability of the user of one mobile money service to
transact directly with users on another system. There are two types of interoperability that are
relevant here - interoperability between JvfNO payment systems (e.g. transfers from Safaricom's
34 ' Posts about M-Pesa on African Antitrust & Competition Law ' <http://africanant itrust.com/tag/m-pesa/> acc essed
16 December 20 15
35 Porteous D, ' EN ABLIN G ENVIRONMENT FOR CELL PHONE BANKING IN AFRICA ' . 33
36 MUTEGI M and com p n, ' Safaricorn gets crucial support in battle with CA'
<http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Corporate-News/Safaricom-gets-crucial-support-in-batt le-with-CA/-
/539550/2698 I58/-/item/0/-/4b9rj5z/-/index.html> accessed 17 January 2016
37 Mohammed 0 , 'Safaricorn will not be forced to loosen its dominant hold on Kenya 's mobile-money mar ket'
<http://qz.com/472 886/safari com-wi II-not-have-to-give-up-its-nearly-80-hoId-of-kenyas-mobile-money-market/>
accessed 15 January 2016




Mpesa to Airtel Money). and interoperability between MNO payment systems and banks' (e.g.
transfers from a Chase Bank account to an Mpesa accountj." While is quite developed at the
moment, interoperability between MNO payment systems is a bit less refined. The transaction
involved is similar to transferring money to an unregistered user.
While it is a start, it requires the money received to be withdrawn through an agent of the sender's
mobile network and redeposited, if one intends to keep it in their mobile wallet. Furthermore, there
is a time limit on withdrawal of the received funds ... Past a certain date , the money cannot be
withdrawn. The system operating between banks and mobile payment systems allows one to keep
the money in whichever account it has been sent to and transact with it through the account, it is
not unreasonable to expect the same from inter-MNO transfers .
2.3.2 Agent exclusivity
In the past, mobile money providers were allowed to enter into agreements with their agents that
restricted them from being agents of other service providers'". For example, an agent of
Safaricorri's Mpesa could not be an agent ofAirtel ' s Airtel Money at the same time. This presented
a significant problem with regard to competition
Given the reliance of mobile money transfer on an agent network, the establishment of an agent
network in a market with an already established agent network is a significant expense that raised
the barriers for entry for mobile money transfer. It is an uphill task to compete against an entity
with an established and growing agent network and as such, the new entrants into the mobile
money space are deterred from joining.
On the flipside of this issue, it has been argued by the established providers that removing the
requirement on agent exclusivity will lead to a stunted growth of the agent network'l' as the
39 Argent J. Hanson J A and Gomez M P. 'The Regulation of Mobile Money in Rwanda(August) (2013)
40 Muthiora, 'Enabling Mobile Money Policies in Kenya' 19




providers will have no impetus to expand and improve their agent network if the other providers
can be allowed to piggyback on their established network'P .
The Competition Authority of Kenya, in 2014, ruled that Safaricom, the country's most dominant
mobile money provider, had to open up its agent network to other providers . Safaricom had pre-
emptively lifted their exclusivity barriers and as such, that barrier to competition has been lifted .
42 Leishman P and Davidson N. 'The case for interoperability: Mobile money services would create for customers and





3 The Current Legal Framework
At the moment, mobile payment systems are regulated by the following legislation:
I . Ken ya Information & Communications Act: provides the regulatory framework for the
licensing & operation of telecoms.
II. National Payments System (NPS) Act, 20 II: Where MMT has a designation as a
Payment Instrument and a designation as a Payment Service Provider.
III. Proceeds of Crime & Anti Money laundering Act , 2009: Mobile Money Transfer
institutions are 'Reporting Institutions' for purposes of the Act and have a duty to report
suspicious activity
iv. Central Bank of Kenya Act : regulates all financial institutions and entities, including
payment systems'". The oversight inspection and enforcement duties of the Central
Bank are form ally recognized".
v. Central Bank of Kenya: For the time being, establishes most of the substantive
regulation on Mobile Money Transfer systems
VI. Competition Act , 20 II: ensures equ al market opportunity by all players
VII. Banking Act: proscribes certain dealings by non-licensed institutions, e.g. taking
deposits from the public, misleading advertising for deposits.
Despite the numerous pieces of legislation applicable to mobile payment systems, the available
regulations still have numerous shortcomings, These gaps in the legislation have the potential to
lead to some undesirable outcomes and it is this that shall be the focus of this paper.
The current regulations shall be analyzed with reference to the areas of regulations discussed
above.
3.1 Regulation of Systemic Risk
The current approach taken to limit systemic risk is simply to impose daily transaction limits on
the mobile payment servi ces. This greatly reduces the net amount of money held within the mobile
payments system and as such, the risk of a collapse of the economic system due to a collapse of
the mobile payment systems is all but eliminated.
•>Section 4A, Central Bank of Kenya Act Chapter 491 Laws of Kenya




3.2 Regulation of Operational Risk
3.2 .1 Credit Risk
Control over Custo mers' Funds
Despite the numerous applications of mobile money transfer, the service is essentially a tunnel for
money to pass from one person to another. The service provid ers have absolutely no control over
the money in the sense that the money is never actually held by them.
Going back to the structure of the service (and the legal requirement), there is a requ irement that
the money being transferred be held in a commercial bank. The account holder in this case is a
Trust with the customers as the beneficiaries'". With this arrangement, the service providers cannot
access funds in this account for whate ver reasons that could arise . In the case of bankruptcy, the
funds remain the property of the M-Pesa customers . In addition to this , mobile money transfer
services cannot create new money in the wa y that banks usually do . As such, the money that goes
into the account is, at the ver y least , the amount that should come out of the account.
One issue with this , however, is the fact that accounts in commercial banks earn interest on the
principal. In theory, the customers have a beneficial interest in the money. The amount of money
that this translates to per person (given the average amount oftime that money is in the customer's
M-Pesa account) is negligible and as such, it would be of little use to give it back as interest.
Considering, however, the sheer number of people using the service, the interest that accumulates
in the trust account is a rather significant amount. Before, the regulations in place required that the
interest be spent on charitable activities. This requirement, however, does not exist anymore.
The fact that the funds are ring-fenced from the service providers lends a sigh of relief to
individuals who were worried about the fate of their funds if the service provider were to go
bankrupt. The concern over the banks' treatment of the funds , however, is not assuaged. The fact
that the accounts earn an interest means that the banks holding the mon ey are allowed to
intermediate on the funds. What, then , is the fate of the customer funds if the bank itself were to
go bankrupt? The funds are certainly not double ring-fenced to prevent this outcome. This problem
becomes significant when the aspect of Deposit Insurance is introduced. The money deposited by




the users of the various services are not insured individually" given the fact that the requirements
for compulsory membership of the Deposit Insurance Fund are not met.
Deposit Insurance
Section 24 of the Kenya Deposit Insurance Act (KDI Act) states that any institution licensed by
the Central Bank shall be a member of the fund . Mobile money providers, however, fall Sh0l1 of
the definition of an " institution" under the Central Bank Act. As such, the money deposited by the
users of the various services are not insured individually. The money amount that is held in trust
by the Mpesa providers, however, is covered by Deposit insurance because the Commercial
Bank(s) that the money is deposited into are members of the Kenya Deposit Insurance Fund under
Section 24 above, But in the grand scheme of things, the funds can be considered uninsured given
the fact that the insurance is limited to Ksh. 100, 000 47 and it's meant to cover several million
accounts for a mobile network operator.
The KDI Act defines deposits as the unpaid balance of the aggregate of deposits received or held
by a member institution from or on behalf of a person in the usual course of the business of deposit
taking and shall include":
(a) A bank .draft, certified cheque or other similar instrument or payment instruction, drawn
or made against a deposit account for which the member institution shall be primarily
liable ;
(b) A cheque entered into a payment system notwithstanding any delay or failure by the
member institution in crediting the payee's account; or
(c) Any other liability or financial instrument as may be specified by the Corporation but
excludes :
(i) A deposit that is not payable in Kenya;
(ii) Bearer negotiable instruments of deposit;
(iii) Any sum of money payable under a repurchase agreements;
46 Jack and Suri, 'Mobile money: the economics ofM-PESA ' . 10
47 Section 28 (I) Kenya Deposit Insurance Act 2012




(iv) Interbank transactions; and
(v) An y other liability or financial instrument as may be specified by the Corporation;
The Act still fails to define deposits generall y but defines the deposits that may be insured under
the Fund. As such, whether a deposit shall be protected depends solely on whether the insured
party is a member of the Fund. Given the criteria for compulsory membership under section 24 of
the Act, it cannot be guaranteed that ever y mobile money provider shall have their funds insured.
.3.2.2 Regulation of Security Risk
The AML Act casts a broad net definition-wise as far as financial institutions are concerned.
Mobile money systems are covered under businesses, formal or informal, that transfer money or
value by any means'l", Mobile money systems, by virt ue of being financial institutions under this
definition, are therefore automatically designated as Reporting Institutions.
Under the AML Act financial institutions are obliged to :
I. Monitor any unusual transactions and report any suspicious activity''"
2. Properly identify any person wishing to enter into business with them (KyC)51
3. Establish and maintain customer records (keeping the records of the identities and attached
transactional history for a minimum of 7 years)52
4. Establish and maintain internal reporting procedures
5. Register with the Financial Reporting Centre
In addition, International Anti Money Laundering/ Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML-
CFT) standards set by the Financial Action Task Force require that adequate customer due
diligence be undertaken on all new accounts and on single payment cash transactions. This process
is part of Know Your Customer (KYC) procedures so that suspicious transactions can be identified .
National laws and regulations are required to give effect to these standards, and they typically
require:
49 Section 2, Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act (No. 51 of2012)
50 Section 44. Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act (No. 51 of2012)
51 Sect ion 45. Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act (No. 51 of20 12)




Verification of identity of the client, using a government issued identity document;
Verification of physical address (for example, by production of a bank statement or utility
bill in name of the customer).
If this procedure is not followed, the bank or payment agent may be penalized by the relevant
authority; or frozen out of international payment systems by other banks concerned about the risk
of being associated with illicit activities.P





3.3 Regulations on Competition
The Competition Act (the Act , for the rest of this section) is applicable to all persons engaging in
trade.>' Consequently, mobile network operators are regulated by the Act. The Act establishes the
Competition Authority of Kenya (CAK) as an independent authority that is tasked with
enforcement of the Act.
Concerning dominance in the market. the Act defines a dominant undertaking as one that controls
at least half of the services or production in a certain marker'". While it is not illegal to have a
dominant position in the market a dominant player in the market is subject to increased scrutiny
by CAK.
Abuse of a dominant position, according to the Act, includes:
1. Directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading
conditions;
u. Limiting or restnctmg production, market outlets or market access, investment,
distribution, technical development or technological progress through predatory or other
practices;
Ill. Applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties;
IV. Making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by other parties of supplementary
conditions which by their nature or according to commercial usage have no connection
with the subject-matter of the contracts; and
v. Abuse of an intellectual property right.
Contravention of these provisions results in fines of up to IO million shillings .
54 Section 5. Competition Act No 12 of 20 10




4 Suggestions for Improvements in the Current Regulation
4.1 Regulation of Systemic Risk
Despite the increased importance of mobile money In many countries, the overall impact is
considered negligible . Even if usage were to expand significantly, however, central banks would
still have ways of controlling the balance between electronic money and central bank money and
regulate short-term rates. Most central banks, therefore, consider mobile money neutral (or of low
importance, at best) with regard to monetary policy'",
Mobile payment systems currently pose a far smaller risk to the financial sector than banks and
other financial institutions. In fact "large numbers of clients that frequently transact small amounts
pose limited systemic risk because they represent such a small share of overall financial sector
assets·· .57 However, this is greatly dependent on the transaction amounts remaining as small as
they do are and this is further tied to the transaction limits imposed by the Central Bank.
Every increase in the amount of money transferrable through the mobile payments system IS
always welcomed by the customers. The maximum amount transferable per transaction is 70,000
shillings, the total amount one may transfer in a day is 140,000 and the maximum amount that may
be held in a customer's account at any time is 100,000 shillings . Keeping' these limits low
simplifies the regulation of systemic risk significantly" ; to the extent of being considered a
virtuall y absolute solution.
As a payment system, however, it would be desirable for it to be able to handle more significant
transfers. This would necessitate the formulation of new regulations to deal with the systemic risk
that would undoubtedly arise when mobile money is responsible for a large number oftransactions,
including some large volume transactions.
A number of regulations can be introduced to reduce systemic risk:
56 Bank for International Settlements (BIS ), Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) (20 (2) ,
"Innovations in Retail Payments," Report of the Working Group on Innovations in Retail Payments. Available at
http ://www.b is.org/publ /cpssI02 .pdf
57 Di Castri. 'Mobile Money: Enabling regulatory solutions'






Require the money held w ithin the system to be held in multiple banks
At the moment. there is no regulation on whether the deposits must be placed in multiple banks.
In Afghanistan, the funds must be deposited in several fully prudentially regulated commercial
banks. 59 In this way, the risk of significant loss to the system is spread and a collapse of a single
bank has a less profound impact on the mobile payment system than it would have if all the funds
were held in a single account.
Require the money to be held in banks of a certain standing
In response to concerns raised by banks on the security ofthe deposits, the country's largest mobile
payment service provider replied that it has deposited the M-Pesa money in tier-l (big, stable)
banks that have a much lower risk of collapsing as well in the risk-free government securities.r''
While this is a prudent move by the service provider, it is an isolated case as it is left to each
provider to decide ' where their funds shall be deposited. While it must be appreciated that the
service providers must have conducted their due diligence on the banks that they intend to deposit
their customers' funds in, the extra certainty goes a long way in bolstering public confidence in
the service.
4.2 Regulation of Operational Risk
4.2.1 Credit Risk
In terest
The mobile payment systems should be maintained as a mere conduit to secure customers ' funds .
In any case , it is highly unlikely that the MNOs would be willing to go into banking business (by
meddling with the customers ' funds) as this would put them under extra regulations as financial
institutions . That being said , however, security of the customers ' funds should receive an extra
layer of security given the fact that they are , at the moment, unprotected (individually) by deposit
insurance'" .
59 Di Castri , 'Mobile Money: Enabling regulatory solutions '
60 IRUNGU G and com g n, 'Banks raise alarm over mobile cash deposit insurance
<http://v.'ww.businessdailyafi"ica.com/mobile-cash-deposit- insurance/-/539552/2 157770/-/dgm4oj 'Zl-/index.html>
accessed 25 December 2015




It has been implied that there is virtually no credit risk posed by the mobile payment systems given
the fact that the service providers do not. at any point, have any legal ownership of the money.
However, given the basic operation of a bank, the money does not belong to the clients either, once
it has been deposited by the service providers into a bank account'S. This exposes the clients
(through the trust) to a credit risk . As a result, the clients should be protected from the risks on
their deposits or at the very least. compensated to justify the risk their money is placed under.
The compensation come in the form of interest paid to the customers on their deposits and the
protection comes in the form of deposit insurance (individual) of the customers ' deposits .
The current regulations do not allow non-bank m-money issuers to pay interest on the m-money
to their customers . Interest here is to be understood to include ' interest equivalents' which are
basically any benefits e.g. free airtime given to the customer. As Ehrbeck and Tarazi observed,
there is little reason given by regulators for this ...The regulators simply state that paying interest
is a banking activit y. However, Ehrbeck and Tarazi go on to explain that the definition of banking
activity focuses especially on the deposit taking and the intermediation of the funds by the
institutions, and not the interest alone'". Intermediation places the customers ' money at risk , which
risk is compensated by the interest offered by the institutions carrying out the banking business.
The intermediation gives rise to systemic risk, which is what prudential regulations attempt to
mitigate. While the m-money issuers, such as mobile payment service providers do take deposits
from their customers, the deposits are not held by them ... they are held in totality by commercial
banks , which then intermediate on the funds (as is their business) and pay interest to the trust
account. 64 As such, it is not entirely out of the question to share this interest with the customers,
as the service providers are not allowed, under any circumstances, to benefit from this interest.
6: Unsecured Creditors of Failed Banks: It's Not a Wonderful Life' (199 I ) hn p:!iwww.jstor.or!!istable/l 34167 1
Accessed on 25th November 2015
63 Ehrbeck T and Tarazi M, 'Putting the Banking in Branchless Banking: Regulation and the Case for Interes t-Bearing
and Insured E-Money Savings Accounts' [20 II] 37
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At the moment, there is regulation that could address the issue of deposit insurance with respect to
mobile money. The only barrier to its implementation is a matter of definitions. The Deposit
Insurance Act
The previous deposit protection provided under the Deposit Protection Fund Board had inherent
weaknesses. For instance, protected payment was restricted to one cover per depositor per
institution and no provision was made for the protection of accounts held in a fiduciary capacity.
The new KDI Act allows that where an institution is under a lawful obligation to repay monies to
a depositor who is acting as a trustee for another or as joint owner with another, and the trusteeship
orjo int ownership is disclosed on the records of the institution'" :
a. The deposit shall be deemed to be a deposit separate from any deposit of that depositor
acting in his own behalf or acting in another trust with the same institution
b. The deposit held in trust shall be deemed to be a separate deposit for each beneficiary where
the depositor is a trustee for multiple beneficiaries
c. The deposit held in trust shall be deemed to be separate from other deposits with the
institution on his own behalf or by another trustee with him as the beneficiary
As matters stand , however, it is still unclear whether mobile payment systems are required by the
law to be members of the fund because none of them is. As such , the deposit insurance extends to
the bank accounts held in trust as' individual bank accounts. In the event of a collapse of the bank,
the entire mobile payment system ecosystems would receive a maximum of 100,000 shillings to
be shared among the millions of registered users'".
The KDI Act defines deposits as the unpaid balance of the aggregate of deposits received or held
by a member institution from or on behalfof a person in the usual course of the business of deposit
taking and shall include:
65 'Reinventing the Wheel : "Pass Through" Deposit Insurance coverage for Mobile Mone y in Kenya I Mobile for
Development ' <http://vvww.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/reinventing-the-wheel-pass-through-deposit-
insurance-coverage-for-mobile-money-in-kenya> accessed 25 December 20 I5






(a) A bank draft certified cheque or other similar instrument or payment instruction, drawn
or made against a deposit account for which the member institution shall be primarily
liable ;
(b) A cheque entered into a payment system notwithstanding any delay or failure by the
member institution in crediting the payee's account; or
(c) Any other liability or financial instrument as may be specified by the Corporation but
excludes:
(i) A deposit that is not payable in Kenya ;
(ii) Bearer negotiable instruments of deposit;
(iii) Any sum of money payable under a repurchase agreem~nts;
(iv) Interbank transactions: and
(v) Any other liability or financial instrument as may be specified by the Corporation;
The Act still fails to define deposits generally but defines the deposits that may be insured under
the Fund. As such, whether a deposit shall be protected depends solely on whether the insured
party is a member of the Fund. Given the criteria for compulsory membership under section 24 of
the Act, it cannot be guaranteed that every mobile money provider shall have their funds insured.
The mobile payment service providers should, at the very least, be required to be members of the
Deposit Insurance Fund. The money that is held within the systems is placed at risk , which can
hardly be mitigated by insuring the individual trust accounts alone. The law expressly caps the
maximum amount that can be repaid by the Fund at 100,000. Considering the number of registered
mobile money users and the amount of money held within the mobile payment systems, the
compensation by the fund in case of a collapse is so little that it cannot be withdrawn after sharing
among the customers.
4.2.2 Privacy Concerns
In line with the minirnalistic approach that underpinned the original implementation of mobile
payments service in Kenya, unnecessary procedures such as keeping a physical log of transactions




users can make withdrawals through an ATM without providing any information other than their
PINs that are attached to their mobile money accounts.
This would go a long way in eliminating the risk of misuse of personal information such as
signatures and ID numbers. There has been no satisfactory reason justifying the presentation of
identification documents and signing off on each transaction. In fact, some agents do not really
enforce the requirement for signing for each transaction one performs. As such, it can simply be





It is a widely accepted truism that innovation outpaces regulation. The extent to which this happens
is most evident in industries involving digital technology. While this is a fact that cannot be
changed, legislatures have to do their best to keep up with the innovations in the market. This,
however, should be done in a manner that fos ters innovation while keeping to the true function of
the law, which is to protect public interest, in this case.
The spread of mobile payment systems within the country has made it so that most people are
heavily dependent on it for their dail y transactions . The public interest in mobile payment systems,
just like any financial services, cannot be overstated. It is fitting, therefore that the mobile payment
systems be properly regulated.
The recent regulations passed on mobile payment systems are a step in the right direction. A lot of
matters have been canvassed in the National Payment Systems Regulations. More, however, can
be done to ensure that the regulations around mobile money meet a satisfactory standard
Firstly, the cost of introducing new regulations must be justifiable from the perspective of the
regulator, the service provider, and the consumer. The eventual burden of most of the regulations
ends up being shouldered by the consumer because of the service provider increasing their prices
in order to meet the cost of conforming to the newregulation. As such, the regulations should only
be limited to those whose benefit outweigh the cost of implementation.
Second, the regulator must be able to have the perfect balance of reg'lIlation , neither too much nor
too little . Overregulation has been considered by many to be the cause of the slow uptake ofmobile
money in man y jurisdictions. While regulations are not the onl y factor at play here , it has been
argued by man y to be a key contributor. MPESA, the pioneering mobile payments service in
Kenya, launched in 2007 into a regulatory vacuum that allowed it to grow with minimal
supervision.V With the level of uptake of the service, however, effective regulations have to be
67 'U pdate on Regul ation of Branchless Bank ing in Kenya Janua ry 2010' Consultative Group to Assist the Poor




put in place to ensure some measure of control over the industry if a collapse of the industry is to
be avoided.
Finally, the legislature must be willing to enact new legislation to fit new innovations rather than
trying to squeeze new products into the traditional definitions in the law . Regulation of mobile
money has taken the country such a long time mostly due to the fact that the regulators were trying
to regulate a service that the law could not even describe.
While this research does not come close to providing a definitive solution for the regulation of the
mobile money environment in Kenya, it highlight some factors to consider when establishing a
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